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ASSESSING KENYA'S COOPERATIVE MODEL OF
DEVOLUTION: A SITUATION-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
James Thuo Gathii* and Harrison Mbori Otieno**
ABSTRACT
Kenya's form of quasi-federalism termed devolution was introduced under the
Constitution of Kenya (2010) ('2010 Constitution). This governance system establishes 47
county governments which are constitutionally independent sub-national units with
direct election of county level leaders. Given the complexity of devolution's relationship
to national politics, as well as the broad variation in how devolution has unfolded in the
47 counties since 2013, this article argues in favour of a situation-specific assessment of
devolution in Kenya. This analysis departs from the emerging scholarly consensus of
devolution in Kenya represented in two predominant approaches. One approach
contends that devolution in Kenya has simply devolved corruption and patronage from
the national to the county level. Another approach argues that devolution has so far been
relatively successful because it has introduced a new political system at the county level
that has a robust system of checks and balances but that has empowered a new dynamic
in Kenya's politics at the sub-national level. This article argues the first approach paints
the emerging devolution experience with a broad brush that is not reflected in every
county or even on every issue. This article has more in common with the second view.
However, we argue for a more situation-specific, case by case analysis of devolution to
show variations in how devolution has or has not facilitated the delivery of services and
opportunities that were prior to 2013 likely to be unavailable particularly in the most
economically disadvantaged counties.
I INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Constitution inaugurated a weak form of federalism in which 47 new county
governments have functions and powers separate from the national government. The
counties are constitutionally independent subnational units with direct election of
county level leaders. Unlike in the pre-devolution era, when county-level elites owed
their loyalty to national-level elites on whom they relied for patronage and access to the
resources of the state, in the era of devolution county-level leaders must be responsive
to county-level pressures. This is in part because the 2010 Constitution guarantees that at
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least 15% of national revenue every year must be allocated to the counties.1 This
guaranteed monetary allocation, together with the creation of executive and legislative
elections at the county level, provide a level of insulation from national level politics. In
addition, the fact that county assemblies have the power to impeach county Governors, 2
and competitive county level elections, puts pressure on county leaders to be responsive
to highly mobilized county electorates. The 2010 Constitution also created a Senate, as
part of a bi-cameral parliament, to protect county affairs at the national level.3 The
advocacy of the Senate together with county Governors for increased resources from the
national government have played vital roles in defending and expanding the power of
county governments.
The advocacy for county authority and resources has in turn become a driving force
for accountability at two levels: first, between county Governors and county legislatures;
and second, between elected leaders and county electorates. This increased pressure for
accountability between the executive and legislative arms in the counties has decreased
the likelihood of political deadlock in county governance that characterised the first set
of county governments between 2013 and 2017. In the 2017 general elections, voters,
apparently disenchanted with the political deadlocks that characterized county
legislatures and county executives, voted out two thirds of county legislators, half of
Governors and 80% of women representatives elected at the county level to the national
assembly.4 For county level politicians, political deadlocks have therefore also become
undesirable since they slow down access to county resources -both for executing the
politicians' county functions and powers as well as for rewarding their supporters.
Indeed, since county level officials want to protect their access to county resources, they
often seek to limit the national government's control over them. 5 This in turn has
strengthened the support for devolution.
Given the complexity of devolution's relationship to national politics, as well as the
broad variation in how devolution has unfolded in the 47 counties since 2013, this article
argues in favour of a situation-specific rather than a broad-ranging assessment of
devolution. This analysis departs from the emerging scholarly consensus of devolution
in Kenya represented in two predominant approaches. One approach contends that
devolution in Kenya has simply devolved corruption and patronage from the national
1 2010 Constitution art 203(2).
2 County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 s 33.
3 2010 Constitution art 93(1).
4 Michael Chege, 'Kenya's Electoral Misfire' (2018) 29 Journal of Democracy 158, 170. A
combination of factors explain why a large number of women representatives were voted
out, including inadequate political support from their political parties, and lack of resources
to challenge poorly conducted political party primaries: National Democratic Institute and
Federation of Women Lawyers, 'A Gender Analysis of the 2017 Kenya General Elections'
(Report, February 2018)
<https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Gender% 20Analysis% 20of% 202017% 20General
Elections% 20FINAL% 20High% 20Res% 20for% 20Printer% 20-
%20NEW%20COVER_small.pdf> 6.
5 See generally Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis, 'Decentralisation in Kenya:
The Governance of Governors' (2016) 54 Journal of Modern African Studies 1; Alex Dyzenhaus,
'Decentralisation: Accountability in Local Government' in Nic Cheeseman (ed), Institutions
and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments (Cambridge
University Press, 2018) 327.
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to the county level.6 The other approach argues that devolution has so far been relatively
successful because it has introduced a new political system at the county level that has
a robust system of checks and balances.7 This article shows that the first approach makes
a totalising argument that is not reflected in every county or even on every issue - even
in some of the counties with the worst corruption. This article has more in common with
the second view. However, we argue for a more situation-specific, case by case analysis
of devolution to show variations in how devolution has or has not facilitated the delivery
of services and opportunities that were, prior to 2013, likely to be unavailable. A case-
by-case analysis does not imply that no general patterns can be drawn from the newly
emerging devolution experience. Rather, this approach foregrounds thick description as
a starting point and springboard for analysis and for asking further questions. This
approach makes it possible to understand devolution in light of the specificities of the
particular context. Thus, as noted in Part III below, some regions of the country have,
since the establishment of devolution and for the first time, had benefits such as
tarmacked roads and hospitals that conduct caesarean operations. Adopting a situation-
specific analysis helps to refer to the emerging devolution experience in a way that
complements and adds to approaches that look for patterns such as the two approaches
described above.
An example of why this more fine-grained assessment of the merits and demerits of
devolution in Kenya is warranted can also be gleaned from the 2013 general elections.
In those elections, devolved governance played what in retrospect was a one-time role
in reducing the high-stakes winner-take-all nature of Kenya's first-past-the-post election
system. The 47 counties created a new and important arena of political contestation that
de-emphasized the zero-sum competition over the national Presidency that has
characterized Kenyan elections since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991.8 In
the 2013 presidential election cycle, county elections gave Kenya's opposition parties
control over more county governorships in the country than the ruling party. That
included the very highly visible Nairobi county, the seat of the Kenyan government. The
new governing opportunities in the counties gave the opposition the promise that they
could translate victories at the county level into future opportunities of winning power
at the national level.9 However, in the August 2017 elections, the incumbent President's
party reversed this possibility and won a majority of county Governors' races. More
importantly, the August 2017 presidential elections saw a return of a highly polarised
election in a two-person horse race that split the country into ethnic voting blocks.10
6 Michelle D'Arcy and Agnes Cornell, 'Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: Everyone's Turn
to Eat?' (2016) 115 African Affairs 246; Brendon J Cannon and Jacob Haji Ali, 'Devolution in
Kenya Four Years On: A Review of Implementation and Effects in Mandera County' (2018) 8
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 1.
7 See generally Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, above n 5, 6.
8 James Gathii, 'Implementing a New Constitution in a Competitive Authoritarian Context:
The Case of Kenya' in Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Haq (eds), From Parchment to Practice:
Implementing New Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
9 Rachel Beatty Ried1 and J Tyler Dickovick, 'Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa'
(2014) 49 Studies in Comparative International Development 321, 327.
10 Chege, above n 4, 158.
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The design of Kenya's devolution was in part intended to accommodate the multi-
ethnic nature of Kenya's politics.11 Devolution ensures more ethnic groups' political
inclusion, representation and power sharing in Kenya's 47 counties than is possible
within a centralised state.12 A primary goal of this devolution scheme was to temper
competing claims of access to national power and resources based on ethnic loyalties.
The political parties formed after the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991
primarily comprised members of the ethnic communities of the respective party leaders.
Devolution was regarded as an antidote to ethnic based politics as well as a mechanism
of addressing and remedying grievances relating to the uneven allocation of
government resources-including land-between various regions and ethnic groups.1 3
Overall, devolution at the county level has enhanced horizontal accountability and,
in at least the 2013 elections, reduced the high-stakes winner take all nature of Kenya's
Presidential elections. Further, in the pre-2010 period elites at the county level were more
likely to be accountable to their patrons at the national level than to their local or county
level electorates. The devolution introduced by the 2010 Constitution reduced the
likelihood of such an outcome.1 4 Much less clear is the extent to which devolution in
most counties has met other objectives of better local service delivery, fostering national
unity, enhancing self-governance and alleviating poverty.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II outlines Kenya's scheme of devolution. Part
III critically assesses Kenya's system of devolution. Part IV concludes the paper.
II FROM CENTRALISATION TO DEVOLUTION
Although Kenya's independence Constitution of 1963 inaugurated a system of
regionalism, by 1969 this system of diffusion of power had been dismantled and had
been replaced with a centralised system of government. 15 To reverse this legacy of a
centralised authoritarian state, the 2010 Constitution 'devolved' fiscal, political and
administrative powers to 47 counties. 16 Devolution sought to counter the centralisation
1 Yash Ghai, 'Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism: The 2010 Kenya Constitution' in Yash Ghai
and Jill Cottrell Ghai (eds), Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism: Kenyan Perspectives (Katiba
Institute, 2016) 98, 75.
12 Ben Christopher Nyabira and Zemelak Ayitenew Ayele, 'The State of Political Inclusion of
Ethnic Communities Under Kenya's Devolved System' (2016) 20 Law, Democracy and
Development 131, 131-2.
13 On this, see Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land,
Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Illegal and/or Irregular Allocation of Public
Land (Republic of Kenya, 2004).
14 See Rachel Beatty Riedl, Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa (Cambridge
University Press, 2014); Gathii, 'Implementing a New Constitution', above n 8.
1 See James Gathii, 'Kenya's Legislative Culture and the Evolution of the Kenya Constitution'
in Yash Vyas et al (eds), Law and Development In the Third World (University of Nairobi, 1994)
74, 82.
16 Kenya is one of several African countries to experiment with political decentralization in the
last two decades. For other African cases, see J Tyler Dickovick and Rachel Beatty Riedi,
'Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Final Report and Summary of
Findings' (United States Agency for International Development, September 2010)
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7170/3844afc30d61e792c212fb6b03e8e53014c6.pdf>.
The term devolution, a 'term of art,' was inherited from Great Britain. See Yash Ghai,
'Comparative Theory and Kenya's Devolution' in Conrad M Bosire and Wanjiru Gikonyo
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of political and economic power that had disadvantaged and marginalised many
regions, communities, and individuals. 1 7 Allocation of financing was a major tool
adopted in this new constitutional framework to address regional imbalances in the
allocation of development financing.18 In addition, Kenyans supported a devolved
system of governance to re-channel the distribution of resources in favour of certain
ethnic groups and against others, and in so doing to serve as a mechanism to redress
poverty and inequality. 19 Kenya is therefore typical of countries that have used
decentralisation to promote a measure of local self-rule that gives sub-national
governments meaningful authority over local matters. 20 The 2010 Constitution sought to
achieve these objectives by promoting the participation of more people in the
governance of the country; ensuring a framework of equitable access to national
resources; promoting inclusiveness of ethnic and regional diversities with a view to
accommodating as many ethnic communities in their own governance; as well as
safeguarding community rights. 21 While there have been challenges, 22 the roll out of
(eds), Animating Devolution in Kenya, The Role of the Judiciary: Commentary and Analysis on
Kenya's Emerging Devolution Jurisprudence under the New Constitution (International
Development Law Organization, Judicial Training Institute, Katiba Institute, 2015) 13, 18-20.
17 According to the Supreme Court in The Speaker of the Senate v Attorney-General [2013] eKLR
(Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Reference No 2 of 2013) [316]:
[The] Kenyan people, by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 chose to de-concentrate State power, rights,
duties, competences-shifting substantial aspects to the county government, to be exercised in the
county units, for better and more equitable delivery of the goods of the political order.
18 Article 174 of the 2010 Constitution identifies the objects of devolved government as follows:
(a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;
(b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity;
(c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in
the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;
(d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their
development;
(e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities;
(f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible
services throughout Kenya;
(g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya;
(h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of
Kenya; and
(i) to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.
19 Yash Ghai, 'Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan State' (2008) 2 Journal of Eastern African
Studies 211, 215.
20 See Robert Agranoff, 'Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations' (2004) 14
Regional and Federal Studies 26, 26.
21 See Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (Kenya), 'Final Report' (11 October
2010) 66-7 <https://katibaculturalrights.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/coe-final-report-
2.pdf>.
22 For example, in the first year of devolution there was a petition to dissolve one county
because the Governor and the county Legislature could not work together. See Edwin Mutai,
Uhuru Names Commission ofInquiry for Makueni County Row (10 February 2015) Business Daily
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Uhuru-names-team-to-hear-Makueni-county-
dispute/-/539546/2619508/-/147vk8/-/index.html>. However, that County was not
dissolved and no County has been dissolved to date.
Federal Law Review
devolution has been largely successful. 23 Devolution is now regarded as an
indispensable and irreversible aspect of Kenya's governance system.24
The cooperative nature of Kenya's devolution scheme is captured in the 2010
Constitution's recognition of 'sharing and devolution of power' as an important national
value and principle of governance. 25 Kenya's devolved units (the counties) do not
exercise decentralised power delegated to them from the national level because under
the 2010 Constitution sovereign power is exercised at the county level as well.2 6 Rather,
they exercise sovereign power delegated directly by the people of Kenya. 27 Kenya's
system of devolution is therefore one of shared sovereignty between the central and
county governments. 28 Unlike in the United Kingdom where devolution is
asymmetrical, in Kenya the devolution system is symmetrical in the sense that all 47
counties are granted similar institutional arrangements and powers.2 9
In this sense, Kenya's devolution follows the South African model, which follows the
German model.30 As borrowed from the South African model, Kenya therefore has 'an
integrated, cooperative model of devolution that gives relatively little autonomy to the
counties and requires onoing collaboration among [national and county] governments
rather than competition'1. Based on art 186 of the 2010 Constitution, concurrent powers
23 Copperfield Lagat and Charles Wokabi, 'World Bank Lauds Kenya for Devolution', Daily
Nation (online), 3 February 2015
<http://www.nation.co.ke/1hfestyle/smartcompany/World-Bank-lauds-Kenya-for-
devolution/-/1226/2611618/-/4knkydz/-/index.html>.
24 Kamotho Waiganjo, 'We Risk Paying a Heavy Price if State Stifles Devolution', Standard
Digital (online), 23 June 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001285112/we-
risk-paying-a-heavy-price-if-state-stifles-devolution>.
25 Art 4(2) as read together with art 10(2)(a).
26 See ibid arts 1(1), 1(3)(a)(b), 1(4)(b).
27 As the High Court observed in Institute of Social Accountability v National Assembly [2015]
eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 71 of 2013) [122]:
Article 1(4) of the Constitution recognises two levels of government, the national and county
governments. Each of these levels exercises power derived from the Constitution itself. Under
Article 1 of the Constitution, the county government does not derive its power from the national
government but directly from the People of Kenya and under the Constitution. These two levels of
governments are therefore, in theory, equal and none is subordinate to the other.
28 Article 6(2) of the 2010 Constitution describes the government at the two levels as being
'distinct and inter-dependent'. See also Conrad M Bosire, Devolution for Development,
Conflict Resolution, and Limiting Central Power: An Analysis of the Constitution of Kenya 2010
(PhD Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2013) 304
<http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11394/3008/BosirePHD_2013.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y>.
29 Thus the Supreme Court of Kenya has noted that 'the wisdom of our Constitution is its
categorical rejection of exclusionary claims to powers of governance: its letter and spirit is
suffused with the call for accountability, co-operation, responsiveness and openness': Speaker of
the Senate v Attorney-General [2013] eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion
Reference 2 of 2013) [229] (emphasis in original). For the case of the United Kingdom, see
Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political
Change (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998).
30 Christina Murray, Kenya's 2010 Constitution, 37
<http://www.health.uct.ac.za/usr/publiclaw/staff/Kenyas% 202010% 20Constitution.pdf
31 Ibid.
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are powers that are available to both levels of government. Identifying concurrent
powers in part 1 (National Government) and part 2 (County Government) in the fourth
schedule to the 2010 Constitution is, however, a difficult task. This is because 'similar
subjects in the two lists are not defined in the same terms (eg, transport, water, disaster
management, policies, planning and development, and housing)'. A literal reading of
these provisions shows that the 2010 Constitution creates 'exclusive powers of policy-
making and policy application for the national and county government[s] respectively
within the various shared sectors'.3 3
Take the example of the function and power of health. The National Government has
the function of National referral health facilities, 34 while the counties cover:
(a) county health facilities and pharmacies;
(b) ambulance services;
(c) promotion of primary health care;
(d) licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public;
(e) veterinary services (excluding regulation of the profession);
(f) cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; and
(g) refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.35
The overlapping nature of these powers and functions is perhaps a feature of Kenya's
system of cooperative devolution. Even with cooperative devolution, the constitutional
scheme gives the national government the last word. This is reflected in art 191(2) of the
2010 Constitution, which provides that when national and county law or policy on a
concurrent power conflict, the national law or policy prevails.
Ultimately, consistent with the model of weak devolution adopted in the 2010
Constitution, counties have conferred upon them rather feeble competencies such as
those relating to animal control and welfare as well as trade licensing, trade
development and regulation which are typical of the powers of local governments. 36 In
addition, unlike the national government, county governments have limited power to
32 Conrad Bosire and Yash Pal Ghai, 'Powers and Functions of County Governments', The Star
(online), 27 April 2013 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/04/27/powers-and-
functions-of-county-governmentsc766556>.
33 Ibid. See sch 4 of the 2010 Constitution dealing with the functions of agriculture and health.
The National Government deals with agricultural policy and health policy: 2010 Constitution
sch 4 pt 1 items 28-9. The counties deal with a myriad of functions under the heads
'[a] griculture' (crop and animal husbandry; livestock sale yards; county abattoirs; plant and
animal disease control; and fisheries) and county 'health services': 2010 Constitution sch 4 pt
2 items 1-2.
34 2010 Constitution sch 4 pt 1 item 23.
35 Ibid sch 4 pt 2 item 2. Here any power or function not mentioned (perhaps a national
vaccination campaign) is a residual matter and a national responsibility. The question
therefore is what is 'concurrent' power in this case? The clash between the function and
powers of the National Government and counties was litigated in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v
Attorney General [2014] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 593 of 2013).
36 Although this paper argues that Kenya adopts a weak form of devolution, it is nevertheless
a strong form of devolution in the African context. On this see, Beatty Ried1 and Dickovick,
above n 9, 327.
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raise revenue. Counties only have the power to levy property taxes,37 entertainment
taxes,3 8 user charges for certain services,39 as well as charges for the licensing powers
with regard to activities such as betting, liquor, parking, and trading. 40 Notably of
course, sch 4 of the 2010 Constitution vests more significant functions and powers, such
as those over national defence, foreign affairs, security, 41 police services, national
economic policy and planning as well as monetary policy, currency and banking, on the
national government.
This scheme reflects the cooperative model of devolution which requires the national
and county governments to respect each other's 'functional and institutional integrity'
as well as to 'assist, support and consult' each other, in addition to 'exchanging
information' and 'coordinating policies'.42 The 2010 Constitution requires that each level
of government 'shall perform its functions, and exercise its powers, in a manner that
respects the functional and institutional integrity of government at the other level'.43
To make up for the likely dominance of national law in the counties, counties are
represented in the national Senate by a Senator elected by the voters in each county. The
Senate's powers are mainly restricted to matters concerning county government,
particularly with regard to county finances and elections. 44 In addition, the
establishment of the Senate as the second house of the national Parliament was designed
as an additional check on executive power, particularly on matters affecting the
counties.45
In addition to decentralising political and legislative authority, the 2010 Constitution
guarantees the counties' equitable financial allocations with the national government. 46
7 2010 Constitution art 209(3)(a).
38 Ibid art 209(3)(b).
39 Ibid art 209(4).
40 Ibid sch 4 pt 2 items 4-5.
41 On the evolving relationship between counties and the national government on security
matters, see Dominic Burbidge, 'Security and Devolution in Kenya: Struggles in Applying
Constitutional Provisions to Local Politics' (2018) 3 Strathmore Law Journal 131. In early 2018,
the national government directed counties to work with county commissioners, who are
appointed by the national government as holdovers from the pre-devolution provincial
system of administration, on security matters. See Cyprus Ombati, 'Matiangi: I Said This Was
a New Way of Operation the Government Had Adopted to Curb Crime', Standard Digital
(online), 5 February 2018
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001268491/matiang-i-said-this-was-a-new-
way-of-operation-the-government-had-adopted-to-curb-crime>.
42 2010 Constitution arts 189(1)(a)-(c).
43 Ibid art 189(1)(a).
44 Ibid art 109(4)-(5).
45 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (Kenya), above n 21, 114. According to a
three judge bench of the High Court of Kenya, the constitutional mandate of the Senate:
is that of representation of counties and protection of the interests of counties at the national level;
law-making in relation to matters concerning counties at the national level; and allocation of revenue
to counties, and oversight over national revenue allocated to counties. Its mandate, like that of the
National Assembly, does not extend to matters or functions reserved by the Constitution to counties
at the county level.
Council of Governors v Senate [2015] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 381 of 2014 as
consolidated with Petition No 430 of 2014) [90].
46 2010 Constitution art 201(b)(ii).
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Any expenditures made by Parliament are required to be expended to promote equitable
development. 47 An equalisation fund is established48 with a mandatory allocation to go
towards provisioning of basic services to 'marginalised areas.' 4 9 There is also a
guaranteed fifteen per cent of all national revenues each financial year to be allocated to
county governments.5 0 There is also a Revenue Fund established specifically for county
governments, from which funds cannot be withdrawn except as authorized by
Parliament or a County Assembly.51
The 2010 Constitution's guarantees of financial security eased the rolling-out of all 47
county governments without exception. Within one year of the creation of this devolved
governance system, 'key institutional structures and systems in the County Executives
and County Assemblies' were established. 52 This was a remarkable achievement
because counties were designed to take-up the functions of overlapping layers of prior
administrative structures.53 The roll-out of the counties and the process of transferring
functions to them, and the counties' efforts to build-up their capacity to deliver on these
functions, have provided political insulation from easy reversal.5 4
While we provide a brief assessment of the implementation of devolution here, it is
a process in its early stages -and thus it is still early to draw any definitive conclusions.
The process will be long-term and complex, with a variety of risks, challenges and
opportunities. 55 A significant opportunity has been the ability, under the Senate's
leadership, for year-on-year increases in 'monies sent by the National Treasury to the
counties': Ksh210 billion (USD2.08 billion) in 2013/14 and Ksh226 billion (USD2.26
billion) in 2014/15.56 Ksh287 billion (USD2.87 billion) 'was allocated to the counties for
the 2015/16 financial year after the Senate and National Assembly struck a compromise
47 Ibid art 201(b)(iii).
48 Ibid art 204(1).
49 Ibid art 204(2).
50 Ibid art 203(2).
51 Ibid arts 207(1) and 207(2) respectively.
52 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, 'Assessment of the Implementation
of the System of Devolved Government: From Steps to Strides' (June 2014) 2
<http://devolutionhub.or.ke/file/35e0b4f8ec748888848abe6ef5102eb3.pdf>.
53 These were the Provincial, District and Local Government Administration that together long-
served as a fourth-arm of the Central government.
54 The World Bank notes that with the architectural infrastructure of devolution already put in
place, it would be 'impossible to alter the foundations, at least not without knocking it
down and starting again': Fiscal Decentralisation Knowledge Program Team, 'Devolution
Without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya' (Report, World Bank,
November 2012) vi
<http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/
11/15/000333037_20121115230524/Rendered/PDF/NonAsciiFileNameO.pdf>.
55 Ibid xxviii. See also James Gathii, 'Assessing Kenya's Constitution Five Years Out' in Tom
Ginsburg et al, Measuring Constitutional Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2016) from
which some of the preceding paragraphs were drawn from.
56 Ekwee Ethuro, 'Senate: Advancing Devolution Agenda', Standard Digital (online), 10
February 2017 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228848/senate-advancing-
devolution-agenda>.
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on the Division of Revenue Bill, 2015'.57 The significance of these increases ought to be
seen against the national government's decision to reduce budgetary allocations to the
Judiciary in the 2018-19 financial year.58 Although the reduction in the Judiciary's
spending is directly attributable to the judicial nullification of the August 2017 elections,
the fact that the national government has reduced spending for an arm of the
government, while increasing spending for devolution, suggests the staying power of
devolution relative to judicial transformation. 59
As noted above, the counties were established as equal and interdependent organs,
rather than as entities subordinate to the national government. 60 National-county
relations are conducted through processes of consultation and cooperation. This
cooperative model of devolution is set out in more detail in the Intergovernmental
Relations Act (Kenya) No 2 of 2012 ('IGRA'). The objective of IGRA is to set out a detailed
framework together with its institutional structures and mechanisms for consultation
and cooperation between national and county governments. 6 1 This is cooperation and
consultation between the national and county governments and among county
governments themselves. The Act also provides a mechanism for the resolution of
intergovernmental disputes. 62
The most important institutional mechanism established by IGRA for conducting
inter-governmental relations is the National and County Government Co-ordinating
Summit.63 One of several important consultative bodies established by IGRA is the
Council of County Governors (CoG).> The CoG has, for the most part, been a very
effective advocate of the interests of the Counties vis-a-vis the national government.
While the first chairperson of the CoG adopted a contentious approach in advocating
for the interests of the counties with the national government, subsequent chairs have
adopted a more cooperative approach.
With the decision by Kenya's opposition to work with the government in March 2018
after the tumultuous elections of 2017, the CoG has maintained its cooperative approach
towards the national government. Their most recent move has been more self-
57 Ekwee Ethuro, 'Senate: Advancing Devolution Agenda', Standard Digital (online), 10
February 2017 <htps://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228848/senate-advancing-
devolution-agenda>.
58 This was after the National Assembly allocated a meagre Ksh50 million (USD500 000) for the
repair and construction of new courts in the 2018/2019 budget: Lillian Mutavi, 'Drastic
Budget Cuts Will Stall 70 Judiciary Projects, Maraga Warns', The Star (online), 24 July 2018
<https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/24/drastic-budget-cuts-will-stall-70-
judiciary-projects-maraga-warns_c1792073>.
59 See Gathii, 'Implementing a New Constitution', above n 8.
60 Article 189(1)(a) of the 2010 Constitution states:
[g]overnment at either level shall- perform its functions, and exercise its powers, in a manner that
respects the functional and institutional integrity of government at the other level, and respects the
constitutional status and institutions of government at the other level and, in the case of county
government, within the county level
See also arts 6(2), 189(1)(b)-(c). See also art 6(2) noting that devolution is based on the
principle of distinctness, interdependence, cooperation and consultation.
61 IGRA s 3.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid s 7.
64 Ibid s 19(1).
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preservationist, with Governors demanding immunity from civil and criminal
proceedings when corruption charges were brought against them. 65 The CoG has
aligned itself with the Judiciary in criticizing the national Executive and Parliament for
'using the budget to manipulate the Judiciary'.66
III DEVOLUTION IN KENYA: DECENTRALISING CORRUPTION OR
ACCOUNTABILITY?
A Two Contending Approaches of Assessing Kenya's Devolution
As noted in the introduction, two contending analyses of Kenya's emerging experience
with devolution have emerged. On the one hand, some scholars have argued the
decentralisation introduced by the 2010 Constitution devolved corruption and patronage
from the national to the county level. Michelle D'Arcy and Agnes Cornell, whose work
typifies this approach, argue that it is precisely the opportunities for corruption and
patronage politics introduced by devolution that most account for support for
devolution. 6 These county level officials, it is argued, also have an incentive to defend
devolution against subversion by the central state. 68 According to these scholars,
devolution is likely to exacerbate cleavages at the county level in ways that are likely to
generate conflict. For example, since land governance has been devolved, scholars in this
school of thought argue that there is likely to be a continuation of highly politicised and
ethnised land conflict.69 Further, in some sectors like health, scholars have shown how
devolution has resulted in re-centralisation of power within devolution. For example,
these scholars have shown that power that previously belonged to county level hospitals
has been transferred to county departmental health officials.70 These scholars therefore
argue that devolution in Kenya undermines the benefits associated with decentralisation
such as reducing corruption, and patron-client networks.7 1
By contrast, a competing group of scholars, such as Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch
and Justin Willis, have argued that, notwithstanding its limitations, devolution has so
far been relatively successful. 72 This is because it has introduced a new and robust
political system at the county level that is generating new political struggles with new
actors such as county Governors who are acting in concert to protect their newfound
positions.73 Further, because county Governors are accountable at the local level, they
are under pressure to defend county interests from the central government. In that sense,
65 Imende Benjamin, 'We Need Immunity Just Like the President, Say Governors', The Star
(online), 10 July 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/10/we-need-immunity-
just-like-the-president-say-govemorsC1784447>.
66 See Imende Benjamin, 'Giving Courts Sh50m for Growth in Bad Faith - CoG', The Star
(online), 28 July 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/28/giving-courts-
sh5Om-for-growth-in-bad-faith-cogc1793837>.
67 D'Arcy and Cornell, above n 6; Cannon and Ali, above n 6.
68 D'Arcy and Cornell, above n 6, 248.
69 Catherine Boone, 'Land Conflict and Distributive Politics in Kenya,' (2012) 55 African Studies
Review 75, 75.
70 Edwine W Barasa et al 'Recentralization within Decentralization: County Hospital
Autonomy under Devolution in Kenya' (2017) 12(8) PLOS ONE 1.
71 D'Arcy and Cornell, above n 6.
72 Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, above n 5.
7 Ibid.
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devolution has created a new system of checks and balances to protect county interests
at the local level. Among the limitations identified by this group of scholars is that
devolution has not dismantled the patron-client networks between the central and the
periphery, but rather it has shifted it to the counties. 74 This second group of scholars
have also sought to show how devolution has promoted horizontal accountability
between officials at the county level which has allowed some accountability to county
electorates. 75 Accountability to county electorates has been particularly higher in
counties under opposition control, where the incentives to cooperate with the central
government must be balanced against electorates that demand resistance from such
control.76
The analysis in this article is more aligned with this second view; devolution has had
its challenges, but it has by and large created autonomous entities that have so far de-
centralised the competition for political and economic power in the country. Within
counties, the alliances built (which are often quite informal) in support of devolution
have contributed towards the institutionalisation of devolution as a system of
governance.77 More importantly, this paper argues that while devolution has yet to
result in more equitable distribution of national resources, it has been a major factor in
cooling off the zero-sum and often ethnic nature of electoral competition for the national
presidency -particularly in the 2013 elections, and much less so in the 2017 elections. A
major reason why the 2013 elections cooled off the zero-sum nature of electoral
competition based on ethnicity is that an alliance was formed between candidates from
two major ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Kalejin. These two communities had faced
off in prior ethnic skirmishes in national elections.78 In their election campaign the
unlikely alliance of Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) and William Ruto (a Kalenjin) whipped
up nationalist sentiments as they campaigned for national office on a platform that
gained momentum because both had been indicted by the International Criminal
Court. 79 Further, a more situation-specific analysis shows that in some counties,
devolution has delivered services and opportunities that were prior to 2010 unavailable
and would likely be unavailable today without devolution.
B Corruption and Accountability
Devolution's successes must be seen in light of the challenges that have come with it.
For example, most county expenditures have been on building huge mansions for
Governors, salaries, fuel, and administration costs, rather than on development
74 Ibid.
75 Dyzenhaus, above n 5.
76 Gathii, 'Implementing a New Constitution', above n 8.77 Ibid.
78 The axis of conflict in the 2008 elections, like in prior national elections since 1991 when multi-
party elections were introduced in Kenya, was between the Kalenjin, on the hand, and the
Kikuyu, Kisil, Luo, Luhya, on the other. The Kalenjin regarded these groups as outsiders who
did not have a right to reside in the Rift Valley which the Kalenjin claim is their home. Since
these non-Kalenjin groups traditionally voted for opposition political parties under then
President Daniel Arap Moi's reign, the Kalenjin engaged in ethnic cleansing to punish these
ethnic groups for supporting opposition political parties.
79 Susanne D Mueller, 'Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election
and the Law' (2014) 8 Journal of Eastern African Studies 25.
606 Volume 46
2018 Assessing Kenya's Cooperative Model of Devolution 607
projects.80 Early estimates of their expenditures in the first few years after devolution
was launched showed that only 10 of 30 counties in one analysis had met the 30% target
budget expenditure on development. Counties had instead engaged in wasteful
spending on foreign trips, top of the range vehicles, office furnishings, iPads and
allowances.81
Furthermore, county Governors and members of the Senate are pitched in perennial
battles with the national government for additional allocation of revenues. It was only
in the third quarter of 2018 when the national government finally appeared determined
to begin prosecuting county Governors for corruption offences. 82 The national
government's decision to begin prosecuting county Governors for corruption is perhaps
an indication that President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is serving his last constitutionally
mandated term, is intent on leaving a positive legacy. In addition, because he is term-
limited, he does not need the support of county Governors in the next presidential
election, in 2022. The impetus for the re-energized anti-corruption prosecutions first
arose from public outrage following the disclosure of mega-corruption scandals in the
national government. The vigour of this anti-corruption campaign has now spread from
the national government to county officials.
Many of the newly established County Assemblies have often prioritized spending
that would benefit themselves. This spending includes increased salaries, allowances
and discretionary funds that they were individually in charge of. When Governors stood
in their way relations turned chaotic and Members of County Assemblies often used
their power to impeach the Governors. 83 In at least one county, the President was
petitioned to dissolve a county government on the grounds that it had become
ungovernable. 84 There was considerable litigation challenging the impeachment of
Governors, particularly in the inaugural 2013-17 period. Governors who have been
impeached so far have been protected from ouster by the judiciary.8 5 This is because
County Assemblies did not always follow the impeachment process laid down in the
2010 Constitution and in statute. Another barrier to removal through impeachment is the
Senate, which the County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 empowers to approve
80 Mwaniki Wahome, 'How the Governors Spent Your Money', Daily Nation (online), 5
February 2015 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/How-the-govemors-spent-your-
money/1064-2614608-mqw20hz/index.html>.
81 See World Bank Group, 'Decision Time: Spend More or Spend Smart?' (Public Expenditure
Review Volume 1, December 2014)
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/230971468254049239/pdf/940210WPOv10
Bo0ort0Vol01201400FINAL.pdf>.
82 Justus Wanga, '30 Sitting, Former Governors to Face Corruption Charges' Daily Nation
(online), 29 July 2018 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/30-sitting--former-govemors-to-
face-corruption-charges/1056-4686624-jj4Oca/index.html>; Maggie Fick, 'Kenya to Prosecute
County Governor, Nine Others in Graft Case' Reuters (online), 3 July 2018
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-corruption/kenya-to-prosecute-county-
govemor-nine-others-in-graft-case-idUKKBN1JTOHV?rpc=401&>.
83 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, above n 52, 103.
84 Moses Njagih, 'President Uhuru Kenyatta Declines to Disband Makueni County
Government', Standard Digital (online), 7 September 2015
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000175491/president-uhuru-kenyatta-
declines-to-disband-makueni-county-government>.
85 See, eg, Martin Nyaga Wambora v Speaker of the Senate [2014] eKLR (Kenyan Court of Appeal,
Civil Appeal No 21 of 2014).
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impeachment decisions by County Assemblies. 86 The Senate has done so b
very high threshold for conduct warranting impeachment under the law.8 The large
number of county Governors who faced impeachment motions in the first few years of
devolution has spurred a legal reform initiative to put limits on the ability of County
Assemblies to impeach Governors.88
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) has argued that 40 out of the
47 Governors flaunted the mandatory legal requirements in appointments of their
County Executive Committee Members (CECMs). 89 This claim arises from the
requirement in s 35 of the County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 requiring those
appointed to County government employment to be cleared on financial probity,
corruption, criminal conduct and tax compliance. This is an important governance and
rule of law question that cannot be over-emphasised.
C Service Provision in the Counties
Rural and poorer counties also face the additional challenge of service providers such as
doctors and teachers not working there. Doctors, for example, have had a very
contentious relationship with the counties. Before devolution, they worked for the
national government. After devolution, many of them became county employees. At the
onset of devolution, they went on strike and demanded a national scheme of service
under which they would continue getting paid at the national level, a fact that would
have re-centralized health as national instead of making it a county function.90
Counties have also faced challenges relating to the rigid accounting systems
developed under the Public Finance Management Act (Kenya) No 18 of 2012 ('PFMA').
This system has adversely affected the county level 5 hospitals. The PFMA requires that
each County Treasury ensure that all money raised or received by or on behalf of the
county government be paid into the County Revenue Fund, instead of having these
hospitals keep the money they have raised and received. 91 'These hospitals have thus
lost an important source of revenue, and county treasuries have failed to disburse the
86 County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 ss 33(3)(a)-(b), (4).
87 Moses Njagih, 'Why Gachagua Survived Impeachment Though He Was Guilty of Charges',
Standard Digital (online), 15 September 2016
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000216095/why-gachagua-survived-
impeachment-though-he-was-guilty-of-charges>.
88 Dennis Odunga, 'Bill Seeks to Raise Bar for Governors' Impeachment' Daily Nation (online),
17 May 2014 <https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Bill-seeks-to-raise-bar-for-governors-
impeachment/1950946-2318572-format-xhtml-ugbwft/index.html>.
89 Jael Keya, 'EACC to Reconstitute 40 County Governments' Kenyans.co.ke (online), 21 August
2018 <https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/26347-eacc-reconstitute-40-county-
governments>.90 David Ndii, 'Why the Doctors Are Fighting Devolution' on Daily Nation Blog (13 December
2013) <http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/Why-the-doctors-are-fighting-devolution/-
/1949942/2111146/-/format/xhtml/-/plxa9O/-/index.html>.
91 PFMA s 109(2)(a).
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money back to the hospitals on time.' 92 These hospitals thus found themselves suffering
crippling cash flow and procurement issues.93
Perhaps because of these kinds of challenges, in the recent past the members of the
national assembly, the senators, and the devolution ministry have shown concerted
intention to strengthen devolution by addressing these challenges. Members of the
national government have in recent years attempted, in specific cases successfully, to
review 'some devolution laws to improve working relations between county and
national governments.' 94 One of the key recommendations of reform initiatives has been
to strengthen the role of the Senate.95 This recommendation includes granting the Senate
a role in the process of suspending a county government before it is finalised at the
county level.9 6 The 2010 Constitution vests the President with the final power over
whether or not a county government can be suspended. 97 This power is, however,
checked by the involvement of an independent commission of inquiry and authorisation
from the Senate.98 Another recommendation has been for an increased role of the Senate
in legislation.
D Gaps in County Governance Law
A significant issue that has arisen is the replacement of a deputy governor who has
resigned, been impeached or died. This issue has arisen because there is no statutory or
constitutional provision that anticipates this possibility. It became apparent there was a
gap in the law after the deputy governor of Nairobi City county Polycarp Igathe
resigned soon after being elected in 2017, and after the governor of Nyeri, Wahome
Gakuru, died in a road accident in November 2017. The 2010 Constitution provides that
when a Governor dies the position should be filled by his/her Deputy. 99 As noted
above, the 2010 Constitution and statutory law are, however, silent about what happens
when the office of the Deputy Governor falls vacant. An Advisory Opinion on this
question, requested by the Speaker of Embu County Assembly, from the Supreme Court
held that the 2010 Constitution does not require a fresh election to be conducted when
the office of the deputy governor falls vacant. The court held that the Governor should
nominate a replacement within 14 days and the Senate should vote on that nomination
92 Jaindi Kisero, 'To Stop Corruption, Address the Accounting Hitches in Counties' on Daily
Nation Blog (25 April 2018) <https://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/To-stop-corruption--
address-accounting-hitches-in-counties-/1949942-4520858-14w59gr/index.html>.
93 Ibid.
94 Kennedy Kimanthi, 'Devolution Laws under Review, Says CS Eugene Wamalwa', Daily
Nation (online), 4 June 2018 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Devolution-laws-
under-review--says-CS-Eugene-Wamalwa/1064-4593862-15cetyd/index.html>. See, eg,
Council of Governors v Senate [2015] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 381 of 2014 as
consolidated with Petition No 430 of 2014). The High Court held that County Development
Boards established under the County Governments (Amendment) Act (Kenya) No 13 of 2014
('CGAA') are unconstitutional.
95 Kimanthi, above n 94.
96 Fred Kibor, 'Senate Seeks Powers to Secure Devolution', Standard Digital (online), 9
December 2017 <https:/ /www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001262544/senate-seeks-
powers-to-secure-devolution>.
97 2010 Constitution art 192(1).
98 Ibid art 192(2).
99 Ibid art 182(2).
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within 60 days.1 00 The Court used the provisions relating to vacancies in the office of the
Deputy President as an analogy in reaching its conclusion. The inspiration for applying
this 'principle of congruence' arises from the cooperative structure of devolution
adopted in Kenya's 2010 Constitution.
E Some Devolution Successes
Despite the stated challenges and the need for improvement, devolution has produced
significant successes consistent with the goals that justified the adoption of devolution
in the 2010 Constitution. Our approach is not to generalise such successes, however,
because for every example of what we give as examples of success there are more
counter-examples. Our point is that the examples of success we outline are achievements
that were not possible in the pre-devolution era, when the national government could
not pay attention to local concerns in the same way counties have been able to. Our
premise therefore, is that devolution has given counties the autonomy to experiment
and implement projects in ways that were not possible without devolution.
Makueni county, under the stewardship of Governor Kivutha Kibwana, is a good
example. It has initiated an ambitious experiment in the provision of universal health
coverage. 'Since October 2014, Makueni has been offering its one million residents free
healthcare across all public facilities, including county and sub-county hospitals.'1 0 1
However, the residents are required to enrol by paying a subscription fee of Ksh 500
(USD 5) per household annually in order to enjoy the benefits. 102 'The program, called
MakueniCare, piggybacks on the national government's free primary healthcare policy
and the national coverage provided by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) with
the goal of providing seamless cover across all public health services.' 103 This is
facilitated by the national government, including the provision of free treatment, in-
patient care and ambulatory services, at the thirteen hospitals within the county, paid
for by the county government. 104 Moreover, people subscribed to NHIF enjoy 'free care
at referral facilities outside the country.'1 05 The program has more than doubled the
number of health facilities in less than five years under this innovative approach.106
Makueni county has also launched two pioneer factories -one a fruit processing
plant and the other a milk processing plant. Farmers in Makueni will deliver over 72
100 Re Speaker, County Assembly of Embu [2018] eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya, Reference No 1
of 2015).
101 Patrick Gathara, '(D)evolved Healthcare: Makueni's Trailblazing Experiment in Providing
Universal Health Coverage', The Elephant (online), 11 January 2018
<https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/01/11/devolved-healthcare-makuenis-
trailblazing-experiment-in-providing-universal-health-coverage/>.
102 Pius Maundu, 'Kibwana Launches Ambitious Free Healthcare Plan for Makueni Residents',
Daily Nation (online), 16 September 2016
<https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/makueni/Makueni-County-to-offer-free-healthcare-
to-residents/1183294-3383768-vwve2o/index.html>. The system covers parents and all
their children below 18 years (up to 24 years in the case of students).
103 Gathara, above n 101.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. See also Graham Kajilwa, 'How Makueni Plans to Sustain Subsidised Healthcare
Programme', Standard Digital (online), 5 April 2018
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001275698/how-makueni-plans-to-sustain-
subsidised-healthcare-programme>.
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metric tonnes of raw mango to the factory, and the factory is expected 'to process 2100
metric tonnes of raw mango from across the country, producing 4,000 drums of mango
puree'. 107 The county has also commissioned a milk processing plant.108 The plant has
the capacity to process and pack 300 litres of milk per hour, and 6600 litres in a day.109
So successful have the Makueni projects been that the county is now the first of fifteen
counties to receive cash from the Instruments for Devolution Advice and Support
(IDEAS) programme of the European Union, which has given a Ksh 110 million grant
for the mango puree project.110
These successes in Makueni have emerged only in the second phase of devolution,
after the 2017 elections. In the first phase, Makueni county had witnessed a tumultuous
period. In September 2014, Members of County Assembly (MCAs) in Makueni passed
an impeachment motion against Governor Kivutha Kibwana. 111 This set in motion a
process that nearly led to the suspension of the county government. Coupled with the
unfruitful competition between the national and county governments during the first
five years of devolution, this prevented many tangible achievements during this
period.112 The success witnessed in Makueni provides a good example of the uses of a
situation specific analysis of the benefits and challenges that are emerging from
devolution, and how the principle of subsidiarity is taking root within the Kenyan model
of cooperative devolution. In addition, the fact that in Makueni voters voted out all
(except one) of the MCAs who had unsuccessfully attempted to impeach the Governor
in the 2017 elections1 13 shows there is increased county level accountability between
county legislators and their electorates.
On a more generic level, some counties have made achievements that had not been
possible in the first several decades of Kenya's independence under a unitary
107 'Amazing: Devolution Miracles in Makueni; Two Factories Launched by Gov Kivutha
Kibwana', Kenya Today (online), 12 January 2018 <https://www.kenya-
today.com/business/ devolution-miracles-makueni-factories-milk-mango-kivutha-
kibwana>.
108 Ibid.
109 Wambui Mbuthia, 'Netizens Cmwn Kivutha Kibwana 'the Governor of the Year' for Piloting
Food Processing and Preservation' Ureport 12 January 2018
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2001265699/netizens-crown-kivutha-
kibwana-the-governor-of-the-year-for-piloting-food-processing-and-preservation>.
110 Susan Muhindi, 'EU Gives Makueni Sh110m to Build Fruit Processing Plant', The Star
(online), 17 May 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/05/17/eu-gives-makueni-
shl10m-to-build-fruit-processing-plant_cl759498>.
111 Daniel Wesangula, 'Kibwana: Why Makueni is Best Example that Devolution Works',
Standard Digital (online), 27 January 2018
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001267429/kibwana-why-makueni-is-best-
example-that-devolution-works>. The MCAs had tried to impeach the Governor and he
subsequently moved to dissolve the entire county government. A commission on inquiry
looked into the disputes at Makueni and made some recommendations to the President that
the Makueni County government be suspended. The President, however, never forwarded
the report to the Senate for debate and approval, effectively vetoing the recommendations.
112 Ibid.
113 Mutua Kameti, 'Clean Sweep after Only One Out of 30 Makueni MCAs Bounce Back to
Assembly', The Star (online), 9 August 2017 <https://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2017/08/09/clean-sweep-after-only-one-out-of-30-makueni-mcas-bounce-
back-to c1613599>.
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government. The following examples come from the poorest counties in the country.
These counties have been marginalised by both colonial and post-independence
governments. For example, Lamu county witnessed its first caesarean section operation
since independence. 11 'Mandera county launched its first tarmacked road since
independence.' 1 15 Garissa and West Pokot Counties have been celebrated for increasing
the number of deliveries in hospitals. Other counties such as 'Embu, Kakamega, and
Mandera counties stand out for improving access to healthcare services by providing
free maternal healthcare service kits, incentives to traditional birth attendants and
communit health workers and using WhatsApp messaging to connect health
facilities'. 16 Furthermore, devolution has revamped the area of Early Childhood
Education (ECD) through a rapid increase of enrolment in ECD centres. 117 The emphasis
on funding ECD has opened up the educational system to more children than in the
past.118
IV CONCLUSION
Devolution is less than 10 years old, and while it is too early to say anything definitive
about the success or failure of devolution, it has taken root as a new system of
governance in the country. The fact that the national government has retained vestiges
of the provincial administration by having the county commissioners in every county
indicates the continued discomfort of the national government over giving up its system
of centralised governance fully. This in turn has continued to be a point of tension
between the new devolved units and the national government.
Since county governments have to be accountable to their electorates, to county
officials and to county institutions, this has created very strong incentives for county
politicians to maintain their autonomy from the central government to defend their
newfound opportunities for control of resources and power. County officials also
support devolution because they want to avoid being voted out by an electorate that
loses resources that are re-centralised, or do not come to the counties because of a
powerful central government relative to the counties. A major risk facing devolution
that arose following the 2017 elections has been the inability to dislodge control of the
Kenyan state from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities which have controlled the
Presidency since independence. Following a second electoral loss in the race for
presidency since the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, the opposition began a
campaign to divide Kenya up-in effect to allow those communities excluded from the
114 Silas Apollo, 'How Devolution has Changed Kenya', Daily Nation (online), 23 April 2018
<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/How-devolution-has-changed-Kenya/1056-4494048-
ll7qesa/index.html>.
115 John Kipchirchir, 'How Devolution Has Impacted Positively on Kenyans', Ureport (online),
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in ECD Education centres in Kiambu county doubled after the education sector was
devolved.
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Presidency to secede. While calls for secession receded when the government and the
opposition decided to work together in March 2018, calls for secession demonstrate the
continuation of the grievances that devolution sought to address that remain
unaddressed.
This article has argued that, to understand the successes and failures of devolution,
a more situation-specific analysis is likely to present some of the important nuances that
are emerging in Kenya's relatively new devolution. These nuances are likely to be
missed out in analyses designed to look for broader trends and patterns. In the foregoing
sense this paper therefore departs from some of the current scholarship on devolution
in Kenya. In particular, we distinguish ourselves from scholars who have argued
devolution has simply devolved corruption. This paper has more in common with
scholars who have noted that while devolution has had some successes, it has relocated
patron-client networks from the national level to the county level. From our perspective,
devolution is a contested process accompanied by risks and challenges, and some
successes as well. In other words, there are examples of significant progress in some
counties on issues important to those counties - like the rising availability of hospitals,
educational opportunities and roads, which were unavailable or grossly inadequate
prior to devolution. Other counties may be characterised more by challenges than
successes. Ultimately, there is no single picture that emerges. It is a patchwork of
experiments with varying outcomes that will continue into the future.

